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L Introduction
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed into law the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).' Through the ADA, Congress sought
to remove barriers that prevented individuals with disabilities from enjoying
the same opportunities as the non-disabled.2 At first glance, the ADA seemed
sufficient to provide the long-awaited rights for Americans with disabilities.3
Eight years after its enactment, however, the ADA still has not permitted
Americans with disabilities to enjoy the protections Congress intended.4 The
ambiguous language Congress incorporated into the ADA is to blame.'
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
2. See id. § 12101(b) (stating purpose of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
Congress created the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to "provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." Id.
3. See id. (stating purpose of ADA). Most Americans thought that the ADA could
accomplish its stated purpose of eliminating discrimination based on a disability. See Stephanie
Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis
ofPsychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REv. 701,702 (1997) (describing public's anticipation, at
time of ADA's enactment, of tremendous impact ADA likely would have for individuals with
disabilities); see also Bonnie Tucker & Bruce A. Goldstein, The Americans with Disabilities
Act of1990, in AMERICANS WITH DIsABILIEs ACT: LAW AND REGULATIONS 1, 1 (lst ed. 1991)
(stating that upon ADA's enactment many considered it "Emancipation Proclamation" for
disabled and named July 26, 1990 "Liberation Day for the Disabled"). Twenty-six years prior
to the enactment of the ADA, Congress passed laws protecting citizens of the United States
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. Id. According to
Tucker and Goldstein, expansion of these civil rights to individuals with disabilities was long
overdue. Id.
4. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible ShrinkingProtected Class: Redefining the Scope
ofDisability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 108 (1997)
(discussing inability of ADA to remedy effectively disability discrimination).
5. See id. (arguing that ADA's ambiguous terms have caused courts to raise prima facie
standards for plaintiffs). Although the heightened prima facie standard works to "weed out"
ineligible claimants, it also deprives many disabled individuals of the protection of the ADA.
Id. at 108-09.
IfTIGATING MEASURES AND THE ADA
Congress used broad and vague terms throughout the ADA in an effort
to include all Americans with disabilities within the ADA's scope.6 Rather
than increase the rights of the disabled, however, this ambiguous language has
only confused courts and, as a result, undermined the ADA's power.7 This
Note addresses one specific area of confusion involving a seemingly funda-
mental aspect of the ADA: Who is disabled under the ADA?8 More specifi-
cally, did Congress intend to include under the ADA those individuals who
treat their impairments with medication, aid their impairments with a device,
or ease the effects of their impairments in some other fashion such that the
impairment no longer substantially limits any major life activities? The
question of what constitutes a disability has divided the United States Courts
of Appeals and has perplexed several federal district courts.9
6. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 ViLL. L. REv. 587, 588-89 (1997) (discussing ADA's broad
definition of "disability" and narrow approach many courts use when evaluating individuals'
disabilities). Mayerson states that Congress intended to have the courts apply the ADA liber-
ally. Id. at 588. Rather than liberally construing the term "disability" so as to afford individuals
the right to have their claims heard, however, many courts apply aheightened disability standard
and dismiss claims for failure to prove a disability under the ADA definition. Id. at 589-90.
This application ofa heightened disability standard, Mayerson concludes, is contrary to the pur-
pose of the broad language ofthe ADA: to protect all individuals with disabilities from discrim-
ination. Id. Mayerson recognizes this problem of narrowjudicial interpretation of the ADA's
terms but she focuses her analysis on the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition. Id.
7. See Carolyn L. Weaver, Disabilities Act Cripples Through Ambiguity, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 31, 1991, atA16 (highlighting ambiguities within terms ofADA and potential implications
of such). Since the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts and commentators have
disagreed on the meaning of the term "disability." Id, The ADA and the accompanying EEOC
regulations continue this ambiguity. Neither clarifies exactly what constitutes a disability. Id.;
see also Catherine J. Lanctot,AdfHoc Decision Making andPer Se Prejudice: How Individual-
izing the Determination of"Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL.L. REV. 327,329 (1997)
(stating that until courts resolve issue of exactly who ADA covers, ADA will not have
"transformative effect" that Congress intended it to have); Locke, supra note 4, at 109 (discuss-
ing danger of ADA becoming ineffective due to ambiguities in its terminology); Noreen
Seebacher, Employers' Focus Turns to Disabilities: With Golfer's Case Making Headlines,
Many Again Question Parameters of the ADA, THE DETROrr NEws, Feb. 25, 1998, at B4
(quoting attorney Thomas Kienbaum) (noting that within definition of"disability" under ADA
there are "many gray areas, and different interpretations of them by the courts").
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining disability in broad terms). According to
this section of the United States Code:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual - (A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; 03) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.
Id.
9. See infra Part III (discussing circuit split and district court confusion).
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Part II of this Note reviews the relevant sections of Title I of the ADA,
the legislative history of Title I, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's (EEOC) efforts to implement it, and the elements of a prima facie case
under Title .10 Part III discusses the current division in the United States
Courts of Appeals as well as the confusion among the United States District
Courts regarding the appropriate metho d of analyzing an impairment that a
claimant aids with mitigating measures." Part III.A examines decisions in
which courts have not considered mitigating measures when evaluating ADA
claims. 2 Part III.B discusses decisions in which courts have incorporated the
use of mitigating measures into ADA claim evaluations. 3 Part IV considers
possible ways to remedy the division among the circuits and presents a multi-
factored guideline that could assist courts in the evaluation of ADA claims
involving mitigating measures. 4 Finally, Part V summarizes this persistent
issue and concludes that the multi-factored guideline is the best approach to
assessing impairments that individuals control or aid with mitigating mea-
sures. 15
IL Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act
A. History of the ADA
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to remove barriers that historically
have prevented qualified individuals with disabilities from becoming gainfully
employed. 6 The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
10. See infra Part II (providing overview of Title I of ADA).
11. See infra Part III (discussing confusion among courts of appeals and district courts
regarding issue of mitigating measures). "Mitigating measures" is the term the EEOC uses in
its Interpretive Guidelines to the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997) (describing
mitigating measures). The EEOC mentions medicines and assistive or prosthetic devices as
examples of mitigating measures. Id.
12. See infra Part III.A (evaluating courts of appeals and district courts decisions in which
courts have adhered to EEOC guidelines regarding mitigating measures).
13. See infra Part 1II.B (evaluating courts of appeals and district courts decisions in which
courts have concluded that courts should incorporate mitigating measures into evaluation of
substantially limiting effect of impairment).
14. See infra Part IV (proposing possible methods of solving problem of mitigating
measures and introducing multi-factored guideline).
15. See infra Part V (summarizing mitigating measure problem and multi-factored guide-
line proposal).
16. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (examining background of ADA and purpose
behind enactment of Title I). The ADA requires employers to give disabled individuals the
same consideration for employment as individuals without disabilities. Id.; see also Cyndy
Falgout, Businessmen Told No Need to Fear Disabilities Act, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Apr. 20,
1991, available in 1991 WL 4365943 (stating Congress's purpose in enacting ADA was to
eliminate fear-based artificial barriers to employment for qualified individuals with disabilities).
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against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees,... [nor any] other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment."' 7 The employment provisions of the ADA originated
in Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), which, prior
to the enactment of the ADA, was the primary statutory protection for individ-
uals with disabilities. 8 The primary purpose of Title V of the Rehabilitation
Act was to prohibit disability discrimination by federally funded employers.' 9
Although the Rehabilitation Act is an important civil rights statute for the
disabled, it was unsuccessful in fully remedying discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." Its scope was too limited to address adequately
the widespread discrimination affecting Americans with disabilities." In
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994) (governing employment practices for federally
funded entities). Sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibit
employment discrimination based on an individual's disability by any entity that receives
federal funds or is an executive agency. Id.; see also Jane West, The Evolution of Disability
Rights, in IMPLEMENTINGTHEAMEmCANS WiTHDIsABzriEs ACT 3,10-13 (Lawrence 0. Gostin
& Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (describing legislation leading up to enactment of ADA). This
Note discusses only legislative acts pertaining to the employment of individuals with disabili-
ties. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 addresses this issue. 29 U.S.C. § 791
(1994). It prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified persons with disabilities." Id.;
see also Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements ofthe ADA, in IMPLEMENTINGTHE
AMERIcANsWITHDisABiLrrmEsACT35, 37 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993)
(discussing substantive and procedural basis for ADA).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (describing prohibitions against discrimination as applied to
federally funded employers).
20. See H.R. RrP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267,314 (1990) (citing Louis Harris poll that documents persistence of disability discrimination
even after enactment of Rehabilitation Act of 1973). According to the Louis Harris poll, two-
thirds of all disabled persons of working age are not employed and of that group 66% said they
would like to have a job. Id By citing this poll in the CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS, Congress
evidenced its concern that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was not alleviating the employment
discrimination of disabled individuals. See also Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: An lntroductionforLawyers and Judges, 21 LAND& WATERL. REv. 175, 177
(1994) (noting conclusion of National Council on the Handicapped that federal laws and
programs existing prior to ADA over-emphasized income support and under-emphasized
initiatives to encourage independence and self-sufficiency); Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct andSome Initial Thoughts as to Its ConstitutionalImplica-
tions, l IST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 185,189-97 (1992) (outlining deficiencies ofRehabilitation
Act of 1973 for protection of disabled individuals). Rains cites several limitations of the
Rehabilitation Act that created the need for the ADA: (1) Congress limited the Act's scope to
federally funded employers; (2) the Act lacked enforcement mechanisms; and (3) Congress did
not adequately fund the Act resulting in the inability of the included employers to comply with
the Act's mandates. Id. at 189-91.
21. See Rains, supra note 20, at 189-191 (discussing deficiencies of Rehabilitation Act).
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response to the Rehabilitation Act's shortcomings, Congress enacted the
ADA.22
Congress incorporated much of the language of the employment provi-
sions of the Rehabilitation Act into Title I of the ADA.' In the ADA, how-
ever, Congress expanded the Rehabilitation Act's protections to include indi-
viduals with disabilities employed in the private sector.24 Additionally, the
ADA added explicit enforcement mechanisms that the Rehabilitation Act
lacked.' These modifications reflect Congress's effortto broaden the already
existing protections for individuals with disabilities.26
B. Assistance in Interpreting the ADA
Congress realized that its use of broad language in the ADA rendered the
ADA unenforceable as written.27 In an attempt to remedy this problem, Con-
gress ordered the EEOC to promulgate regulations to clarify the provisions of
the ADA for courts and claimants. 8 On July 26, 1991, one year after the
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (describing tremendous need among disabled for pro-
tection from discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1997) (explainingthatEEOC implementation
provisions for ADA do not apply lesser standard than that of Rehabilitation Act, indicating that
Congress intended to increase rights of disabled); see also Mullen, supra note 20, at 177 (dis-
cussing shortcomings of prior disability discrimination legislation that created need for ADA).
23. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 37 (discussing origin of ADA). Congress incorpo-
rated much of the language of the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA in an effort to minimize the
litigation concerning the application of the ADA. Id. Congress intended courts to apply the
case law already developed under the Rehabilitation Act to ADA claims. Id.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (defining "employer" to include private employers);
Rains, supra note 20, at 190 (noting modifications of provisions of Rehabilitation Act which
Congress incorporated into ADA).
25. See Rains, supra note 20, at 189-191 (discussing shortcomings of Rehabilitation Act
that Congress intended to remedy by enacting ADA). The Rehabilitation Act did not delegate
the duty to enforce its provisions. Id. at 190. In contrast, Congress explicitly charged the
EEOC with implementing and enforcing the terms of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1997) (stating that under ADA, courts are to apply same or
greater standard than that applied under Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
27. See John Parry, Title I - Employment, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIEs AcT 57, 58 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (documenting
criticisms of ADA as "too broad," "confusing," and "hard to interpret"). This broad language,
Parry states, although confusing, may have been necessary. Id. In civil rights legislation, he
states, often one must sacrifice certainty in a law's application in order to obtain the desired
individualized remedies under the law. Id.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (conferring upon EEOC duty to issue regulations to
carry out Title I of ADA); see also Mullen, supra note 20, at 186 (stating that Congress gave
EEOC duty to promulgate rules and regulations to supplement ADA); Tucker & Goldstein,
supra note 3, at 3 (stating that Congress requires EEOC to promulgate regulations to carry out
Title I of ADA as well as oversee and enforce all employment provisions under ADA).
922
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enactment of the ADA, the EEOC issued the requisite regulations.29 The
EEOC's regulations are binding on courts if, as stated in Chevron USA. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Congress mandated the regula-
tions and the resulting regulations constitute a permissible construction of the
statute.
3'
Concurrent with the issuance of these regulations, the EEOC published
interpretive guidelines.32 The EEOC designed the interpretive guidelines to
provide further assistance to claimants, courts, and covered entities in inter-
preting the terms of the ADA.33 Unlike the regulations, Congress did not
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1997). The EEOC issued regulations in accordance with the
Congressional mandate outlined in the ADA. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (directing
EEOC to issue regulations).
30. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
31. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (determining that appropriate standard of review for agency statutory interpretations
made under congressionally delegated authority is two-part test); see also E. Livingston B.
Haskell, Note, "Disclose-or-Abstain" Without Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark
on Rule 14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 199, 206-08 (1998)
(discussing Chevron test). In Chevron, the Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the term "source" as used in the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The Court's task in Chevron was to determine if
courts must adhere to an agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. The interpretation in question
in Chevron arose from the Clean Air Act. Id. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Congress required any company that produces a major new "source" of air pollutants to go
through an extensive review process to obtain a permit Id at 850. The EPA interpreted the term
"source" to refer to the entire plant such that only new plants were subject to the elaborate review
process necessary to obtain a permit. Id at 857-58. Additions and modifications to existing
plants were, therefore, not subject to the review process. Id. The Natural Resources Defense
Council opposed this interpretation of the term "source" and claimed that it contradicted the text
and policy ofthe Clean Air Act. Id at 859. The Courtheld thatthe EPA's definition of "source"
was apermissible construction of the statute. Id. at 866. In doing this, the Court outlined a two-
part testto assist courts in the future review of agencies' statutory interpretations. Id. at 842-43.
The two-part test includes analysis of the following: (1) is the agency interpretation contrary to
a specific statute or statutory intent and (2) is the interpretation of the statute reasonable. Id. The
Court ruled that if Congress has given the agency the authority to clarify a specific provision of
a statute and the resulting agency regulation is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute," the agency action is apermissible construction of the statute. Id. at 844. Through
the application of its newly created test, the Court concluded that: (1) the relevant provisions of
the Clean Air Act do not clearly state Congress's intent in using "source" and (2) the intent that
courts can derive from the statutory language reveals that Congress hoped to expand rather than
confine the EPA's power to regulate particular sources through enforcement of the Clean Air
Act. Id. at 861-62. Thus, the Court held that the EPA's interpretation of "source" was a
permissible construction of the statute and was binding on the courts. Id. at 866.
32. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997).
33. See id. (stating that purpose for interpretive guidance is to assist qualified individuals
with disabilities to understand their rights under ADA as well as to ease and to encourage
compliance by included employers).
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order the EEOC to create these guidelines." Rather, the EEOC issued the
guidelines independently.35 Because they are not congressionally mandated,
the EEOC interpretive guidelines do not bind courts.36 Agency action that is
not congressionally mandated is binding on courts only to the extent that they
explicitly adopts the agency's interpretation. 7 However, courts tend to defer
to nonbinding agency pronouncements because they perceive agencies as
consisting of experts whose opinions courts should not dismiss lightly.3
Thus, when evaluating an ADA claim, courts must incorporate the EEOC
regulations into their analysis but may choose not to incorporate the EEOC
interpretive guidelines.39
34. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (noting EEOC has duty to issue regulations but that
EEOC additionally issued interpretive guidelines because further assistance was necessary).
35. See id. (introducing EEOC interpretive guidelines and stating need for such assis-
tance). "The Commission believes that it is essential to issue interpretive guidance concurrently
with the issuance of this part in order to ensure that qualified individuals with disabilities
understand their rights under this part and to facilitate and encourage compliance by covered
entities." Id.
36. See Robert.A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 58 (1990) (stating that agency interpretations not mandated by
Congress are not binding on courts); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMzIfsTRATIvELAw TREATISE § 6.3, at 239-43 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that when Congress
has not delegated power to agency to issue guidelines, guidelines subsequently issued are not
binding on court). Davis and Pierce state that a court is free to reject an agency position that
is reflected in an interpretive rule. Id. at 239. However, courts must adhere to a congressionally
mandated agency rule if it is a permissible construction of the statute at issue. Id. at 235.
37. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,424-26 (1977) (stating that courts are to give
agency interpretation of statutory terms "important but not controlling significance"); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (stating that EEOC guidelines deserve "great
deference," especially if Act and legislative history support such statutory interpretation, but
such guidelines are not binding on courts); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(stating that when legislative body has not delegated legislative power to agency, regulations
promulgated by such agency are not binding on courts); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
36, at 239 (stating that courts have choice either to reject explicitly or accept agency interpreta-
tion not mandated by Congress); Anthony, supra note 36, at 55 (stating that two-step evaluation
from Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations because they are not made through
formal rulemaking procedures and thus are not binding on courts).
38. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34 (noting that courts should give great deference to
EEOC interpretive guidelines if guidelines support Act and Act's legislative history); Skidmore,
323 U.S. at 140 (explaining that because EEOC guidelines come from "body of experience and
informed judgment," courts "may properly resort [to them] for guidance"); see also DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 36, at 236-39 (discussing controlling weight of non-congressionally
mandated agency interpretations). Some courts appear to give greater deference to the EEOC
interpretive guidelines than others. See infra Subparts IIl.A and III.B (discussing courts'
varying levels of deference to EEOC interpretive guidelines).
39. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 236-39 (discussing levels of deference due various
agency actions).
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C. Making a Claim Under Title I of the ADA
To survive summary judgment, an individual making a Title I claim
under the ADA must sufficiently demonstrate the following: (1) the individual
has a disability, (2) the individual is qualified for the job with or without
reasonable accommodation, and (3) the individual's employer took the ad-
verse employment action because of the existing disability." The first and
often case determinative element is whether the individual has a disability
under the ADA.41 Even though courts treat this element as crucial to the
prima facie case, the ADA's text does not describe precisely what a disability
is.42 Congress did outline within the text of the ADA the three ways that a
claimant may establish the existence of a disability: (1) demonstration of a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity;
(2) demonstration of a record of such an impairment; or (3) demonstration of
evidence that the employer regarded the claimant as having such an impair-
ment.43 Beyond this broad description, however, the ADA is silent on the
issue of what constitutes a disability.' This ambiguity forces courts to look
elsewhere for guidance-the EEOC regulations and the appended interpretive
guidelines.45
1. Impairment that Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
First, an individual is disabled if that person has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.46 Congress so
broadly stated this first method of demonstrating a disability that courts may
wonder exactly what Congress intended by this statement. To assist the
courts, the EEOC promulgated regulations that interpret the following critical
terms within the ADA definition: "physical or mental impairment," "major
life activity," and "substantially limits."47 A "physical or mental impairment,"
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (1994) (discussing elements ofprima facie case under
Title I of ADA).
41. See Locke, supra note 4, at 108 (discussing importance of establishing disability).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" in broad terms).
43. Id.
44. See id. (limiting discussion of"disability" to three general ways claimant may estab-
lish disability under ADA).
45. See id. § 12116 (commanding EEOC to "issue regulations in an accessible format to
carry out this subchapter"). It is clear that Congress realized that the broad language of the
ADA left it unenforceable on its own. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1997) (interpreting Title
I of ADA); id. app. § 1630 (same).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (outlining methods of demonstrating existence of
disability).
47. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)-() (1997) (interpreting "impairment that substantially
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according to the EEOC regulations, is any physiological, mental, or psycho-
logical disorder.48 A "major life activity" includes "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."49 And finally, an impairment is "substan-
tially limiting" if, because of it, the individual is unable to perform any of the
major life activities to a level "that the average person in the general popula-
tion can perform," or if the individual is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which [the] individual can perform" this
activity as compared to the general population." The EEOC regulations add
to the ADA's framework and assist courts in evaluating ADA claims."
The EEOC interpretive guidelines further expand the definition of an
"impairment that substantially limits a major life activity" by providing
additional considerations and examples of impairments that can satisfy the
"substantially limits" requirement. 2 The most controversial of the additional
considerations, and the consideration subject to much debate among the
courts, is the suggestion that courts should ignore mitigating measures when
evaluating both the existence of a physical or mental impairment and the
limits a major life activity").
48. See id. § 1630.2(h) (listing disorders that constitute impairments). The regulations
include as impairments
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or ... [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
Id.
49. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
50. Id. § 1630.20). The EEOC lists factors to consider in determining if an impairment
substantially limits an individual in a major life activity: "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the
impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent
or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment." Id.
51. Id. § 1630.2.
52. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (g)-(j) (1997) (interpreting ADA and EEOC definitions
of "disability" and suggesting additional considerations for use in evaluating substantially
limiting effects of disabilities). The guidelines mention that the effect ofthe impairment on the
life of an individual is the crucial factor and that a case by case determination is essential. Id.
Also, the guidelines further discuss the duration and impact of factors that the EEOC addresses
in the regulations. Id. The duration of the impairment, according to the guidelines, refers to
the length of time that the impairment itself exists. Id. The impact of the impairment includes
the residual effects of the actual impairment. Id. The EEOC cites, as examples of substantially
limiting impairments, an individual with artificial legs, a diabetic who without insulin would
lapse into a coma, and an individual who is blind. Id.
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extent to which such an impairment limits an individual's major life activ-
ities. 3 According to the guidelines, mitigating measures include, but are not
limited to, medicines and assistive or prosthetic devices. 4 The appendix to
the EEOC regulations suggests that the ADA should protect from discrimina-
tion an individual whose medically assisted impairment would substantially
limit the individual in a major life activity if left in an unaided state." This
implies that even if medical assistance alleviates or minimizes an individual's
symptoms, a court could 'still find that individual to be disabled under the
ADA. 6 Through this recommendation, the EEOC appears to advocate the
expansion of ADA coverage to individuals who, under the plain language of
the ADA, would have received protection only under the third method of
proving the existence of a disability: being regarded as having a disability. 7
2. Record of an Impairment that Substantially Limits
a Major Life Activity
An individual who either previously had, but who no longer has, an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or an individual
misclassified as having such an impairment is an individual with a record of
an impairment. 8 The ADA protects individuals with a record of an impair-
53. See id. app. §§ 1630.2(h)-j) (noting that courts should not consider mitigating mea-
sures used to alleviate impairment's effects). The EEOC interpretive guidelines provide an
example of a claim that a court should evaluate without consideration of mitigating measures.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997). The individual in the example suffers from epilepsy
controlled with medication. Id According to the EEOC interpretive guidelines, the courts
should make their determination without considering the medication both if the underlying
illness is an impairment and if it substantially limits a major life activity. Id. Under this
rationale, the individual clearly has an impairment and if the individual can show that without
medication the epilepsy will substantially limit a major life activity, courts can consider the
individual disabled as well. Id The EEOC's interpretation suggests that an individual with
epilepsy may, although presently not suffering from any symptoms of the disorder, satisfy the
requirements for a disability. Id.. See also infra Part III (discussing circuit split on issue of
mitigating measures).
54. 29 C.F.R_ app. § 1630.2(h) (1997).
55. Id. app. § 1630.20) (1997).
56. See id. (providing example of individuals for whom medicine or medical aides
alleviate symptoms but who, according to EEOC, are still individuals with disabilities under
ADA); see also infra Parts III-V (discussing judicial reaction to EEOC appendix on mitigating
measure issue and impact of such reactions).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (1997) (describing individuals who do not have substan-
tially limiting impairment but may still qualify as disabled under ADA); see also infra Part
II.C.3 (describing "regarded as" prong of disability definition).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1997). See Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L.
REV. 759,770 (1992) (discussing "record of' disability). This Note focuses mainly on the first
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ment to prevent the possibility of discrimination arising from the discovery of
a record indicating a prior substantially limiting impairment.5 9 The controver-
sial provision of the EEOC interpretive guidelines that addresses mitigating
measures also applies to this method of proving the existence of a disability."
Mitigating measures should not, according to the EEOC, be a part of a disabil-
ity analysis. 1 The distinguishing factor in this methodology is that the
claimed disability existed in the past. For purposes of the EEOC's provision
on mitigating measures, however, the timing of the disability is not critical.6
The individual still must show that the impairment substantially limited a
major life activity, and thus, according to the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
the court should not integrate the mitigating measures into the evaluation.
3. Regarded as Having an Impairment that Substantially
Limits a Major Life Activity
The final method of demonstrating a disability is by establishing that the
employer regarded the individual as having a disability.' Claimants who
cannot successfully utilize the first or second method of proving a disability
method of proving a disability: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
59. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 40 (explaining EEOC regulations regarding individu-
als discriminated against because of "record of' impairment). Examples of individuals who
may have valid claims under the "record of impairment" prong of the disability definition are
individuals who have a history of cancer or heart disease or a misdiagnosis of a learning
disability. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k)).
60. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1997) (noting that mitigating measures should not
be part of claim evaluation). This provision of the interpretive guidelines necessarily applies
to the second method of proving a disability, record of a substantially limiting impairment,
because a claim brought under this method, like the first method, involves an evaluation of the
limiting effects of an impairment. Id.
61. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1997). Although the mitigating measure provision applies
to this method of proving a disability, the case law and commentaries addressing this issue have
focused on the first method: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
62. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1997).
63. See id. (explaining congressional intent in creating "record of disability" method of
proving disability under ADA). Congress, by creating this provision, intended to protect
individuals who suffered from a substantially limiting impairment that no longer substantially
affects their lives. Id.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994) (outlining three methods of proving existence of
disability); Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 471, 480-81 (1991) (discussing "regarded as" method of
proving disability); see also Mayerson, supra note 6, 591-98 (same). This Note focuses on the
first method of proving a disability: an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
For a thorough analysis of the "regarded as" method of proving a disability, see the above-cited
references.
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under the ADA often turnto this final option." According to the EEOC regula-
tions, a claimant who an employer regards as having a disability is an individ-
ual: (1) who has an impairment that is not substantially limiting but whose
employer treats the individual as if it is; (2) whose impairment is substantially
limiting only because of employer and employee attitudes toward the impair-
ment; or (3) who does not have an impairment but whose employer treats that
individual as if she has a substantially limiting impairment." Individuals who
aid their impairment with medication and bring their claims in a court that
adheres to the EEOC's position on mitigating measures are less likely to need
to resort to this final method of proving their disability. For these individuals,
a court that evaluates an impairment in its unaided state is more likely to find
that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.67 However, under
the EEOC's interpretation, this final method of proving a disability is still
necessary to protect those individuals who, even without consideration of
mitigating measures, do not have an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.68 In addition, this method is necessary to protect those
individuals who do not claim to have a substantially limiting impairment but
who nonetheless have employers who treat them as if they do.69
65. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o (1997) (discussing third method ofproving disability);
see also School Bd. ofNassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,283 (1987) (stating for first time
that disability may substantially limit individual in major life activity because of attitude of
employer regarding employee's otherwise nonlimiting impairment). The Court decided Arline
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. However, case law developed under the Rehabilita-
tion Act is applicable to issues arising under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o (1997).
67. See Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (evaluating claimant in his unmedicated state and concluding that individual's impair-
ment substantially limited him in major life activity). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (evaluating claimants' vision impairments in their medi-
cated states and concluding that their vision impairments do not substantially limit the claim-
ants).
68. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o (1997) (discussing rationale for "regarded as" portion
of disability definition).
69. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 40 (explaining "regarded as" prong of disability
definition). The notion underlying the "regarded as disabled" aspect of the disability claim is
that the ADA should cover individuals not only because they have a substantially limiting
impairment but also because they are treated as if they do. Id. But see Mayerson, supra note
6, at 594-96 (stressing importance of separating proof requirements for actually disabled and
regarded as disabled). Mayerson focuses on courts' convergence ofthese requirements into one
standard and the implications of this convergence. Id. Mayerson stresses the importance of
keeping separate the requirements for "substantially limited" and "regarded as." Id. Three
different methods exist for demonstrating a disability in order to protect all who may feel the
impact of the stigma associated with disabilities. Id. The purpose of the "regarded as" aspect
of the disability claim was, according to Mayerson, to protect individuals without disabilities
from disability discrimination by employers. Id. at 597.
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Regardless of which of the three methods the claimant uses to prove the
existence of a disability, the claimant must prove that the basis for the adverse
employment action was in fact the disability.0 It is obvious, then, that the
proof of an actual disability, record of a disability, or treatment as a disabled
individual is a crucial part of any claimant's case. At this critical phase of a
trial, claimants and courts alike need the benefit of a reliable framework to
determine what constitutes a disability and who exactly the ADA includes
within its definition. This need for certainty has proven to be most poignant
in cases in which the claimant suffers from an impairment that is no longer
substantially limiting due to the claimant's use of medication or other assistive
device.7' It is in these cases that the courts have been unable to reach a
uniform method of evaluation.72
III Dissension Among the United States Courts of Appeals
and District Courts
The United States Courts of Appeals disagree whether an individual who
has an impairment has a disability under the ADA if that individual alleviates
the effects of the impairment with medicine or other assistive devices.73
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (stating that only adverse employment actions made
because of individual's disability are subject to evaluation under ADA).
71. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,858 (1st Cir. 1998) (statingthat
statutory language is not clear regarding meaning of impairment that "substantially limits"
individual and that statute completely ignores issue of mitigating measures).
72. See infra Part III (discussing circuit split and district court confusion on issue of
mitigating measures).
73. See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (following
EEOC interpretive guidelines which recommend evaluating claimant's impairment without
consideration of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,859-63
(1st Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d
Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (same), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521 (1 th Cir.
1996) (same); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (same), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Sherback v. Wright Automotive Group, 987 F. Supp. 433, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(same); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Shiflett v. GE
Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same); Wilson v.
Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-07 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Sicard v.
City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Canon v. Clark, 883
F. Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same); Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336,
339-40 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (same). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902
(10th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with EEOC interpretive guidelines and deciding to evaluate
claimants' disabilities with consideration of mitigating measures); Gilday v. Mecosta County,
124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Wilking v. County ofRamsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 853-
54 (D. Minn. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08
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Because of this, courts are currently unpredictable forums for claimants with
such conditions, as well as for the defendant-employers in these actions.7'
The confusion arises from a disagreement over the statutory requirement that,
in order to qualify as a disability under the ADA, an impairment must substan-
tially limit a major life activity. 5 If an individual suffers from an underlying
impairment but, because she receives medical aid, she does not suffer from the
impairment's limiting effects, can the impairment still substantially limit a
major life activity? The EEOC interpretive guidelines suggest that mitigating
measures should not be a factor in evaluating an impairment and, thus, courts
could still find that a medicated impairment substantially limits an individ-
ual's major life activities.76 Some courts, however, have disagreed with the
EEOC.77 This disagreement has created a division among the circuits.78 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits all explicitly follow the EEOC guidelines and do not con-
sider mitigating measures when evaluating an individual's disability. 9 In
(D.R.I. 1997) (same); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 n.6 (E.D. Okla.
1997) (same); Gaddy ex. rel. Gaddy v. FourB Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331,336-37 (D. Kan. 1997)
(same); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1087-88 (D. Kan. 1996) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,879-81 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), affid, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998); Schluterv. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-48 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (same); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808,813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
74. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 328 (noting that inconsistent evaluation of ADA claims
has resulted in "patchwork of holdings, often varying from court to court, as to what set of
symptoms constitutes a disability"); Huntley Paton, ADA Still Baffling to Employers, DALLAS
Bus. J., Dec. 5, 1997, at42,44 (noting that ADA is continual source of confusion for litigants).
75. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858-60 (1st Cir. 1998)
(explaining that several interpretations of ADA's term "substantially limiting" exist); see also
Mayerson, supra note 6, at 589 (claiming judicial interpretations of "disability" under ADA are
too narrow in scope). Mayerson, however, focuses on the "regarded as" prong of the definition
of disability under the ADA. Id. Nonetheless, she supports the tenet of this Note in that she
agrees that courts' interpretation of "disability" has led to inconsistent rulings and precedents.
Id; see also Locke supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that ambiguity of ADA's terms has led to
narrowing of scope of "disability").
76. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1997) (stating that courts should not consider
mitigating measures when evaluating limiting effects of impairment).
77. See cases cited infra note 151 (listing circuit and district court decisions in which
court decided not to adhere to EEOC interpretive guidelines regarding issue of mitigating
measures).
78. See Major Depression and Other Psychiatric Disorders Under ADA: EEOC Guid-
ance, EMPLOYMENT L. UPDATE (Rutkowski & Assocs.), June 1997, § F (discussing disagree-
ment among courts regarding deference due EEOC's guidelines on mitigating measures).
79. See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (following
EEOC guidelines on issue of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136
F.3d 854, 859-63 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136
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contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
have determined that mitigating measures should be part of the inquiry when
evaluating this threshold issue.8" Similarly, the district courts in the remaining
circuits have disagreed regarding the proper standard to apply.8'
This dissension among the courts can prove to be of significant impor-
tance for ADA claimants and their employers alike. 2 Several circuits permit
easy passage through this threshold requirement, thereby affording the claim-
ant the opportunity to present her claim in court.83 However, the same claim
in a circuit that does not broadly interpret the term "disability" may not
survive a summaryjudgment motion.84 For example, if a court does not defer
to the EEOC interpretive guidelines and instead rules that a court should
consider mitigating measures in an impairment evaluation, a claimant with an
impairment aided by mitigating measures has drastically diminished odds of
surviving a summary judgment motion in that court.8 5 Likewise, a defendant-
F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th
Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102
F.3d 516, 521 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (same). The Ninth Circuit has also followed the EEOC guide-
lines and disregarded mitigating measures in ADA claim evaluations. See Holihan v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (accepting, without analysis, EEOC guidelines
that suggest courts should evaluate impairments without considering mitigating measures), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997).
80. See Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (disregarding
EEOC guidelines on issue of mitigating measures in disability determination); Gilday v.
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
81. See cases cited supra note 73 (listing cases in which courts have evaluated and ruled
on issue of mitigating measures in disability determination).
82. See Mark Johnson, Lawsuits Expanding Scope ofDisabilities Act, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Aug. 31, 1997, at 39 (discussing implications of ambiguities in ADA). "The courts are all
over the place ... [s]omeone with diabetes in one jurisdiction is considered disabled, while if
it's controlled with medication in another jurisdiction it's not. It's very hard to divine any
guidance." Id. (quoting Stanley Kiszkiel, former regional attorney with EEOC in Miami).
83. See, e.g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998)
(relying on EEOC's position on mitigating measures and, as result, permitting plaintiff to
present his claim in full); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-63 (1st Cir.
1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F. 3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (same); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (1lth Cir. 1996) (same);
Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
84. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (dis-
regarding EEOC's position on mitigating measures and, as result, denying plaintiffs' opportu-
nity to present their ADA claim); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1996) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-81 (D. Kan.
1996) (same), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998). In all of these cases, the court dismissed
the ADA action for failure to state a claim.
85. See, e.g., Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (denying claimants opportunity to present their
claims because court did not apply EEOC guidelines and therefore evaluated claimants' impair-
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employer who knows that a court does not apply the EEOC guidelines will not
be eager to settle with such a claimant in anticipation of a summary judgment
motion in its favor. Thus, the court in which an individual brings a claim
becomes crucial to the individual's case. Congress did not intend such a
result. 6
A. Courts Should Not Consider Mitigating Measures:
Deference to EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
The courts that have chosen to give deference to the EEOC's position on
mitigating measures have done so after evaluating the language of the ADA,
its legislative history, and Congress's intent in creating the ADA.87 These
courts agree that the position on mitigating measures that the EEOC presented
in its interpretive guidelines comports with the language of the ADA and the
ADA's legislative history.88 Additionally, several courts have pointed to
overarching policy concerns that have compelled them to apply the method of
evaluation that the EEOC embodied in its interpretive guidelines.8 9
1. Legislative History and Language of the ADA
The United States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. stated "if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
ments in their treated states); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 763-65 (6th Cir. 1997)
(same); Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881 (same).
86. See Mayerson, supra note 6, at 588-89 (noting Congress intended courts to interpret
"disability" broadly).
87. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859-61 (reviewing legislative history of ADA and Congres-
sional intent in creating ADA); Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (examining legislative history to
determine if EEOC guidelines are permissible construction of ADA); Harris, 102 F.3d at 521
(same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905-06 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(examining legislative history and finding that regardless of EEOC guidelines, ADA's legisla-
tive history dictates evaluation of impairments without considering mitigating measures);
Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1028-29 (concluding EEOC interpretation is "entirely consistent" with
legislative history and ADA itself); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87,93 (D.D.C. 1997)
(findingADA legislative history dictates evaluation of impairments in their unmedicated states);
Sicard v. City ofSioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1437-38 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding legislative
history supports EEOC interpretive guidelines).
88. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts have agreed with EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
89. See Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87,93 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding it would be
improper to create blanket exclusion to specific groups simply because disability is easy to
correct); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 906 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(pointing to remedial nature of ADA as reason to construe ADA's terms broadly enough to
evaluate individuals without consideration of medicinal aides).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 917 (1998)
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. '90
Chevron binds courts to an agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress
requested such an interpretation and if the resulting interpretation is reason-
able.91 An unrequested interpretation, like the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
is not binding, but courts may defer to it nonetheless. 92 Courts have consis-
tently agreed that if an agency interpretation is a reasonable construction of
the statute, it merits adherence.93 Several courts have evaluated the EEOC
interpretive guidelines under this reasonableness test.94 To be a reasonable
construction of the ADA and thus worthy of adherence, the EEOC interpretive
guidelines must not contradict the plain language of the ADA and must find
support in the legislative history of the ADA.95
In Harris v. H& WContracting Co.,96 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the reasonableness of the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines when deciding if a disability evaluation should include an
assessment of mitigating measures. 97 The claimant in Harris suffered from
90. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
91. Id. at 843-44.
92. See Anthony, supra note 36, at 58 (discussing when courts must defer to agency
interpretation and when they may defer to agency interpretation).
93. Id. at 59-60 (discussing courts' general support of non-congressionally mandated
agency determinations if they are reasonable).
94. See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521 (1 th Cir. 1996) (determin-
ing EEOC interpretive guidelines are reasonable construction ofADA); Wilson v. Pennsylvania
State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 904 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc
Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
95. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (creating test for courts to apply when evaluating
agency interpretations).
96. 102 F.3d 516 (llth Cir. 1996).
97. See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,521-22 (11 th Cir. 1996) (finding
court should not consider mitigating measures when determining disability). In Harris, the
court evaluated the ADA claim that Harris brought after H & W Contracting Company termi-
nated her. Id. at 518. Harris alleged that the termination was in response to a panic attack she
suffered following a change in the medication she took for an underlying thyroid condition
(Graves' disease). Id. To decide if Harris had an impairment that rose to the level of a disabil-
ity, the court first determined if it should consider Harris's Graves' disease in the medicated or
unmedicated state. Id. at 520. To decide this issue, the court undertook an analysis of the
following: (1) the EEOC interpretive guidelines which dictate that courts disregard mitigating
measures; (2) the plain language of the ADA; and (3) the legislative history behind the ADA's
passage. Id. at 521-22. The court reasoned that, following Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., it must adhere to a congressionally mandated agency interpre-
tation that is a reasonable construction of the statute. Id. at 521 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The EEOC's interpreta-
tion, the court reasoned, was not in direct conflict with the language of the ADA. Id. In
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Graves' disease, the symptoms of which she controlled medically.98 Prior to
analyzing Harris's claim, the court examined the EEOC interpretive guidelines
to determine if her medication should be a factor in the evaluation of her
disability." To ascertain the reasonableness of the EEOC position on mitigat-
ing measures, the court first examined the text of the ADA and compared it
to that of the EEOC interpretive guidelines." Upon review, the court found
no direct conflict between the EEOC interpretation and the language of the
ADA. 0' The court then looked to the relevant House and Senate Reports. 2
In these reports, the court discovered that Congress clearly intended to have
the courts evaluate impairments without consideration of mitigating
measures. 3 As a result of these two findings, the court concluded that the
EEOC interpretive guidelines were a reasonable construction of the ADA and
thus merited the court's deference.' 4  The Eleventh Circuit adopted the
EEOC's interpretation and chose to evaluate Harris's impairment without
consideration of the mitigating measures used to alleviate her symptoms."
addition, the legislative history of the Act directly supports the agency interpretation. Id. Thus,
the court found that it should adhere to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. Id. As a result, the
court remanded the case to the district court to evaluate Harris's Graves' disease in its unmedi-
cated state. Id. at 524.
98. Id. at 522-23. Graves' disease may involve any of the following conditions:
hyperthyroidism accompanied by goiter, exophthalmos, or myxedema. See id. at 522 (citing
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOsIs AND THERAPY, 1038-39 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 15th ed.
1987)). Without medication, the most frequent symptoms of the disease include nervousness,
increased sweating, hypersensitivity to heat, palpitations, fatigue, weight loss, weakness, and
frequent bowel movements. Id. In some extreme cases, Graves' disease can result in "thyroid
shock" which, if untreated, can cause cardiovascular collapse. Id. Because Harris controlled
her disorder with medication, the court's position on the mitigating measures issue was critical
to the viability of her claim. Id.
99. See id. at 520 (evaluating EEOC interpretive guidelines).
100. Id.at521.
101. See id. (stating"[t]here is nothing inherently illogical about determiningthe existence





105. Id. Following its decision, the court denied H & W Contracting Co. summary
judgment. Id. To avoid summaryjudgment in this instance, Harris needed only to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 521-22. In this case and many other
similar ADA cases, the claimant must show that an issue of fact exists regarding whether an
impairment rises to the level of disability. Id. The evaluation of the issue of mitigating
measures determines whether a claimant with a treatable impairment ever has the opportunity
to present her claim. See Mayerson, supra note 6, at 589 (discussing dismissal of ADA claims
through summary judgment motions); Locke, supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that courts are
935
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In Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co.,0 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly relied on the EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines in evaluating a claimant's epilepsy without considering the
medication the claimant took to control the symptoms. 0 7 The Matczak court,
like the Harris court, found the ADA's legislative history to be supportive of
the EEOC's position.' This support, the court reasoned, allowed itto adhere
to the EEOC's recommendations." 9
The Matczak and Harris decisions exemplify the notion that courts
should give deference to agency interpretations, even if Congress has not
mandated such agency action, provided that: (1) the interpretations are not in
conflict with the terms of the statute which they are expounding and (2) the
legislative history of the statute supports the interpretations."0 These courts,
raising prima facie standard for Title I ADA claims resulting in increased summary judgments
against plaintiffs).
106. 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
107. Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933,936-37 (3d Cir. 1997)
(following EEOC interpretive guidelines and stating that courts should not consider mitigating
measures when evaluating disabilities). In Matczak, the court considered whether Matczak had
established the existence of his disability such that it should not grant summary judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at 935. Matczak was diagnosed with epilepsy thirty years before Frankford
Candy and Chocolate Company hired him as a Maintenance Supervisor in April 1993. Id. at
935. He controlled his epilepsy with medication and did not suffer from any seizures until
November 1993. Id. Following this seizure, Matczak's doctor put him on a new course of
medication for five and one-half months. Id. Although Matczak could only do limited work
during those five and one-half months, the doctor permitted him to return to a regular schedule
after the course of medication. Id. Frankford fired Matczak during this restrictive period. Id.
Matczak alleged that the firing was due to his disability (epilepsy). Id. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit overruled the district court's decision to grant Frankford summary judg-
ment by finding that Matczak had adequately shown that epilepsy substantially limits him in a
major life activity. Id. at 937. In evaluating this impairment, the court determined that mit-
igating measures, in this case the medicine controlling his seizures, should not factor into the
evaluation. Id. The court outlined two reasons for deferring to the EEOC guidelines on this
matter: (1) courts should give an agency's interpretation of its own regulations great deference
and (2) the ADA's legislative history strongly supports this method of evaluation. Id. As a
result, the court did not consider Matczak's medication and found enough evidence showing
that Matczak's epilepsy substantially limited a major life activity to preclude summary judg-
ment. Id. at 938.
108. Id. at 937.
109. See id. at 937-38 (explaining rationale for evaluating epilepsy without consideration
of medication).
110. See id. (accepting EEOC interpretation); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d
516,521 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (same); see also Anthony, supra note 36, at 59-60 (discussing author-
itative power of congressionally mandated agency interpretations versus interpretations that
Congress did not mandate).
MITIGATING MEASURES AND THE ADA7
along with several district courts, have concluded that the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures is in accordance with Congress's intent as evidenced
by both the language of the ADA and the House and Senate Reports that
accompanied the ADA's passage."' Several courts that have concurred in this
reasoning have additionally put forth policy-based arguments in support of
their decisions to consider impairments in their unaided states."2
2. Policy Reasons in Support of the EEOC's Interpretation
Congress created Title I of the ADA to ensure the same employment
opportunities for individuals with and without disabilities."' To further this
goal, many courts reason that a broad interpretation of the ADA is neces-
sary."' They argue that because Congress intended the ADA to be a sweeping
anti-discrimination statute, courts must liberally apply the ADA's terms."'
As a result, these courts find that the only permissible way to deal with the
issue of mitigating measures is to disregard the measures when evaluating the
111. See Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937 (finding EEOC's position is in accordance with
Congress's intent); Harris, 102 F.3d at 521 (same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept.,
964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that "even a cursory examination of the
legislative history" indicates that EEOC patterned its guidelines on language found in congres-
sional reports); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va.
1997) (concluding that EEOC interpretation is "entirely consistent" with legislative history of
ADA and ADA itself); Siceard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-38 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (stating that legislative history supports EEOC interpretive guidelines).
112. See Arnoldv. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (lst Cir. 1998) (stating that
courts should construe ADA's terms broadly to further its remedial purpose); Fallacaro v.
Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting policy considerations that support
EEOC's position); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept, 964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (bolstering decision with policy considerations); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp.,
960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (outlining purpose of ADA); see also Subpart II.A
(outlining history of ADA).
114. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that remedial nature of ADA
necessitates broad interpretation of it by courts). But see Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police
Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 906 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting but then disregarding policy concerns in
support of evaluating impairments in their medicated state). The court in Wilson concluded that
courts should evaluate impairments in their unmedicated states. Id. at 907. In reaching this
conclusion, the Wilson court addressed and then discredited policy arguments contrary to its
conclusion. Id. at 906-07. The greatest concern in interpreting the ADA in accordance with
the EEOC on the issue of mitigating measures is that such an interpretation will lead to the
"unwarranted expansion of disability laws beyond their intended scope." Id. at 906. The Wilson
court noted this concern but found it unconvincing. Id.
115. See id. at 861 (finding courts must apply terms of ADA broadly); Wilson, 964 F.
Supp. at 906 (finding remedial nature of ADA necessitates broad interpretation of its terms);
Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1029 (finding courts' liberal application of ADA terms is proper).
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limiting effect of an impairment. 1 6 Acceptance of the EEOC's position on
this issue, these courts reason, will allow courts to apply liberally the ADA's
protections. 17
In Fallacaro v. Richardson,"' the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia addressed these policy concerns regarding the consider-
ation of mitigating measures." 9 In its evaluation of a claimant's vision
impairment claim, the court found that it should not consider corrective eye
wear. 20 It is unfair, the court reasoned, to deprive a group of individuals of
coverage under the ADA simply because their disability is one that is easy to
correct.' This reasoning, the court continued, is based on common sense.1
22
An individual does not eliminate an underlying disability by the use of a
prosthetic device or medication even though such assistance may alleviate the
impairment's effects."z If a court did choose to evaluate an underlying
impairment in its aided state, the court would unreasonably exclude from
116. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863 (finding courts should evaluate impairments in their
unmedicated states); Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 898 (finding remedial purpose of ADA dictates
evaluation without consideration of mitigating measures); Shiflett, 960 F. Supp. at 1029 (same).
117. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 863 (finding courts must evaluate impairments in their
unmedicated states); Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 905-06 (concluding liberal application of ADA
requires evaluation of impairment without consideration of mitigating measures); Shiflett, 960
F. Supp. at 1029 (same).
118. 965F. Supp. 87(D.D.C. 1997).
119. See Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997) (following EEOC
guidelines). In Fallacaro, the court evaluated whether an individual who has corrected vision
of 20/20 but is legally blind without corrective lenses has an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity. Id. at 90. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied Fallacaro a promo-
tion because she did not satisfy the uncorrected vision requirement of the position. Id.
Fallacaro alleged that the vision requirement was a blanket exclusion of individuals with vision
impairments. Id. The IRS stated that it based its exclusion in safety concerns and that Fallacaro
was simply medically ineligible and not handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. After
evaluating recent case law and the legislative history of both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, the court reasoned that it would be furthering the purpose of both of the acts if it
evaluated Fallacaro's impairment in its uncorrected state. Id. at 92-94. The court, therefore,
denied the IRS's motion to dismiss and found that the IRS mustjustify its adverse employment
decision before a fact-finder. Id. at 94. The court also denied partial summary judgment to
Fallacaro and noted that simply because her vision impairment may rise to the level of a
disability did not mean that she did not have to satisfy the requirement that she was a "qualified
individual." Id. In summary, the court concluded that it should enable Fallacaro to benefit from
the provisions of the ADA and granted her an evaluation of the alleged adverse employment
action. Id.
120. Id. at 94.
121. Id. at 93.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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coverage an entire group of potentially disabled individuals at the threshold
question level. 24 Such individuals would be deprived of even the chance to
present their claims to the court." According to the Fallacaro court, it then
follows that to prevent this inequitable result, courts should evaluate the
underlying impairment rather than the temporarily corrected state of the
impairment. 26 Therefore, in its attempt to further the broad anti-discrimina-
tion policy of the ADA, the Fallacaro court ruled that it should not consider
mitigating measures when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment. 27
The court eventually denied summary judgment for the defendant-employer
and ordered an assessment of the claimant's vision without the assistance of
corrective lenses.
In Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Department, 129 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also advanced a policy
argument in support of its decision to evaluate a claimant's vision impairment
without the aid of corrective lenses. 30 In particular, the court cited to the
generally accepted policy that because the ADA is a remedial statute, courts
should construe it broadly.' Agreeing with this proposition, the court further
124. Id.
125. Id. The court stated that the facts of this case exemplify this logic. Id. The IRS
argued that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect Fallacaro because her corrected vision did not
rise to the level of a disability. Id. However, the IRS excluded her from the special agent
position specifically because of her uncorrected vision level. Id. The court reasoned that the
factthatthe IRS considers the uncorrected vision level in its qualifications for the agentposition





129. 964 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
130. See Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964F. Supp. 898,907 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that courts should not consider mitigating measures when evaluating impact of
impairment). The court in Wilson examined whether individuals denied positions as state
troopers due to a failure to satisfy the uncorrected visual acuity requirement can bring a claim
under the ADA. Id. at 900. The police department argued that because Wilson can see clearly
with corrective lenses his impairment does not substantially limit him in any major life activi-
ties. Id. at 902. The court disagreed with this rationale and denied the police department's
motion for summaryjudgment. Id at 908-09. According to the court, the EEOC guidelines and
the legislative history on the issue supported its decision to evaluate Wilson's vision without
consideration of his corrective lenses. Id. at 905. The court found that a claimant who does not
currently experience the adverse effects of his impairment because of medication should still
have the opportunity to present his ADA claim to a fact-finder. Id.
131. See id. at 906 (discussing remedial nature of ADA) (citing Heilweil v. Mt. Sinai
Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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explained that a broad interpretation of the ADA necessarily entails a liberal
application of its protections.'32 Such a liberal application, the court reasoned,
includes the evaluation of an individual's impairment in its unmedicated
state.'33 The court recognized that this was the best way to ensure coverage
of all individuals with disabilities.'34 This broad application will likely result
in coverage of individuals who are not obviously substantially impaired.'35
The court recognized that the public may not think of these individuals as
being disabled.'36 However, it reasoned that societal intuition should not
dictate nor interpret the ADA.'37 Instead, looking to Congress's intent to
create a broadly sweeping remedial statute, the court discovered that an
evaluation of an impairment in its unaided state is proper.'38 The Wilson
court, in its conclusion on this issue, decided that corrective eye wear should
not be a consideration in evaluating a vision impairment.'39
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit added yet
another policy argument in support of the EEOC's position on mitigating
measures' 4 In Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,'41 the First Circuit
reasoned that an evaluation of a claimant's impairment in its medicated state
would result in different treatment of individuals who are financially able to
treat their impairment. 142 For example, courts will evaluate an individual who
132. Id. at 907.
133. See id. (concluding that courts should not interpret "substantially limits" so narrowly




136. See id. at 906-07 (giving example of individual confined to wheelchair as compared
to individual who can alleviate impairment by putting on eyeglasses).
137. Id. at 907.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 906-07 (concluding that corrective lenses should not be consideration when
deciding if impairment substantially limits major life activity). The court first determined
whether the EEOC guidelines were a reasonable construction of the ADA and worthy of the
court's deference. Id. at 904-05. The language of the EEOC and the legislative history of the
Act convinced the court that the EEOC's position on the issue of mitigating measures was
reasonable. Id. at 905. The court supplemented its conclusion with the policy argument stated
in the text of this Note. See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text (outlining policy
argument).
140. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,861 (lstCir. 1998) (expressing
policy in support of EEOC guidelines regarding mitigating measures).
141. 136 F.3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998)
142. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,861 (1 st Cir. 1998) (supporting
EEOC interpretive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures). InArnold, the court had to deter-
mine if Arnold had a disability under the ADA and, if he did, whether the United Parcel Service
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cannot afford medication that may fully alleviate her symptoms in her un-
treated state.'43 On the other hand, courts will evaluate in her treated state an
individual who can afford the medication and uses it.'" Under this rationale,
courts will treat less favorably under the ADA individuals who are more
financially secure. 4 Congress did not, according to the court in Arnold,
intend this inequitable result. 46 The Arnold court suggests that the only
equitable remedy is to evaluate all claimants' impairments in their unmedi-
cated states.' 47
After analyzing the legislative history of the ADA and the policy consid-
erations involved in its enactment, these courts have concluded that the sug-
gestions of the EEOC interpretive guidelines properly interpret the ADA .
48
Thus, according to these courts, a court should disregard mitigating measures
when evaluating impairments. 149 Because of this broad interpretation of the
ADA, individuals with impairments aided by medication or other assistive
devices who bring their claims in these courts can expect to have the opportu-
nity to present their claim fully. 5 Not all courts, however, have accepted the
EEOC's position on the issue of mitigating measures.
(UPS) denied him employment because of his disability. Id. at 856. Arnold suffered from
insulin-dependent diabetes which he controlled through daily injections ofinsulin and aregimen
of diet and exercise. Id. Arnold alleged that he is disabled under the ADA because, according
to his doctor's reports, he would die without his medication. Id. The court evaluated the
legislative history of the ADA, the plain statutory language of the ADA that addresses the
"substantially limiting" requirement, and the policy considerations for and against the courts'
consideration of mitigating measures in the evaluation of a claimant's impairment. Id. at 857-
863. The court concluded that all ofthese sources support the theory that courts should disregard
mitigating measures when evaluating a claimant's impairment. Id. at 863. In addition, the court
noted that the EEOC interpretive guidelines support this application of the ADA. Id. at 863-64.
The court realized that the EEOC interpretive guidelines do not have controlling weight but
concluded, nonetheless, that because the guidelines are reasonable and consistent with the
remedial purpose of the ADA, they were worthy of the court's deference. Id. at 864. As a result
of its evaluation, the court concluded that it should not consider mitigating measures when
evaluating impairments for an ADA claim. Id. at 866. The Arnold court, however, limited its
holding to the particular medical condition in question in this claim, diabetes mellitus. Id.





148. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts have agreed with EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
149. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing court decisions which adhere to EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures).
150. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998)
(remanding claim to lower court to determine ADA claim on presented facts); Matczak v.
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B. Courts Should Consider Mitigating Measures:
Non-Deferential Treatment of the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
Similar to the courts that have explicitly followed the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures, the courts of appeals and district courts that have
chosen not to adhere to the EEOC interpretive guidelines have done so only
after a thorough evaluation of both the language of the ADA and its legislative
history.15 ' These courts, however, have concluded that the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines are not a reasonable construction of the ADA. 152 In support of
their decisions to disregard the EEOC's position on mitigating measures, these
courts consistently have put forth two basic arguments: (1) the language of
the EEOC interpretive guidelines regarding mitigating measures directly
conflicts with the plain language of the ADA'53 and (2) the EEOC's directions
to evaluate the effects of an impairment without considering the measures
used to alleviate its effects conflict with other provisions of the EEOC inter-
pretive guidelines. 
15
1. Conflict Between the Language of the EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines and the Plain Language of the ADA
To accept that the EEOC interpretive guidelines are a reasonable con-
struction of the ADA, courts must find that the guidelines do not contradict
Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Harris v. H
& W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).
151. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC interpretive guidelines provision on mitigating measures were neither consistent with text
of ADA nor with other provisions of interpretive guidelines); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124
F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3
(5th Cir. 1996) (same); Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 853-54 (D. Minn.
1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08 (D.R.I. 1997)
(same); Gaddy ex. reL Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (D. Kan. 1997)
(same); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1087-88 (D. Kan. 1996) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-81 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), afj'd,
141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
152. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts explain their rationale
for disagreeing with EEOC interpretive guidelines on issue of mitigating measures).
153. See cases citedsupra note 151 (listing cases in which courts found EEOC interpretive
guidelines in conflict with plain language of ADA).
154. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 903 (10th Cir. 1997) (evaluating
legislative history of ADA as well as language included in Act itself in course of considering
appropriate method of evaluating mitigated impairments); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d
760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-
08 (D.R.I. 1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880-81 (D.
Kan. 1996) (same), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the ADA's plain language. 155 Not all courts have found this to be true. 56 To
many, the EEOC guidelines directly contradict the language of the ADA. 7
If such a conflict exists, then the guidelines are neither reasonable nor worthy
ofjudicial deference.'58
In Gilday v. Mecosta County,159 for example, a divided United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the EEOC's position on
mitigating measures directly contradicts the ADA's requirement that an
impairment be substantially limiting. 6° The claimant in Gilday suffered from
diabetes, which he controlled with a prescribed regime of medication, diet,
155. See DAviS &PIERCE, supra note 36, at 239-43 (discussing necessary requirements for
court to find agency interpretation is reasonable construction of statute).
156. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (finding EEOC guidelines directly at odds with plain
language of ADA); Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (same); Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 107-08 (same);
Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880-81 (same).
157. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC guidelines directly at odds with plain language ofADA); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124
F.3d 760,767 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102,
107-08 (D.RI. 1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880-81
(D. Kan. 1996) (same), affrd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
158. See DAVIS& PIERCE, supra note 36, at 239-43 (explaining that courts do not have to
adhere to unreasonable agency interpretations of statute); Anthony, supra note 36, at 58 (ex-
plaining deference due non-congressionally mandated agency interpretations).
159. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
160. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,766 (6th Cir. 1997) (deciding mitigat-
ing measures should be part of evaluation of impairment's substantially limiting impact). In
Gilday, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether Gilday presented
sufficient evidence of a disability to avoid summary judgment on his claim. Id. at 761. In
particular, the court had to decide if a diabetic who controls the symptoms of his disease with
medication can still satisfy the requirements of a disability under the ADA. Id. Kevin Gilday
was an emergency medical technician for 16 years until Mecosta County terminated him for
"conduct unbecoming a paramedic" and several instances of rudeness to co-workers and
patients. Id. Gilday alleged that Mecosta County terminated him because of his diabetic
condition. Id. Mecosta County, he alleged, should have accommodated his diabetic condition
by permitting him to be in a less chaotic atmosphere. Id. Such accommodation, he claimed,
would have prevented the sudden alterations in his blood sugar that often resulted in his hostile
behavior. Id. Thus, Gilday requested that the court adhere to the EEOC interpretive guidelines
and consider his diabetes in its unmedicated state, the state in which it is substantially limiting.
Id. Judge Kennedy, writing the majority opinion on this issue, concluded that the EEOC's
interpretation is in direct conflict with the ADA and therefore is not a reasonable construction
of the statute. Id. at 767. The ADA requires that an impairment be substantially limiting to be
a disability. Id. The EEOC's method of evaluation allows coverage of an individual whose
impairment does not actually substantially limit her activities. Id. This, Judge Kennedy
reasoned, is an impermissible construction of the ADA. Id. This issue divided the court with
Judges Kennedy and Guy agreeing that the EEOC's interpretation was not a permissible one.
Id. at 768. All three judges, however, concurred that in this case, a material issue of fact did
remain. Id. at 766. Thus, the court remanded Gilday's claim for further proceedings. Id.
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and exercise.' In determining the summaryjudgment issue, all three judges
on the panel concurred that a material issue of fact remained. The judges
did not, however, concur on the issue of how to evaluate a medicated impair-
ment under the ADA.
163
Judge Kennedy, joined by Judge Guy, concluded that the court must
evaluate an individual's impairment in light of the mitigating measures the
individual uses to alleviate its effects."6 Judge Kennedy pointed to a direct
conflict between the EEOC interpretive guidelines and the ADA to support
her conclusion.165 Under the express terms of the ADA, an impairment does
not rise to the level of a disability unless it substantially limits a major life
activity."6 The related provision of the EEOC interpretive guidelines suggests
that courts partake in the substantially limiting evaluation without consider-
ation of mitigating measures. 67 If a court chooses to follow the EEOC's
recommendation, an impairment that does not substantially limit an individual
because of the medication used to treat it may still constitute a disability under
the ADA. 6 This interpretation, according to Judge Kennedy, essentially
eliminates the substantially limiting requirement of the ADA.'69 Judge
Kennedy concluded that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines are clearly at
odds with the statutory language of the ADA. 7
161. See id. at 761 (describing Gilday's condition). Gilday suffered from non-insulin
dependent diabetes. Id. He treated this condition with oral medication, blood sugar monitoring,
and a restricted diet. Id.
162. Id. at 766. With or without consideration of mitigating measures, all threejudges on
the panel agreed that, in this case, the plaintiff had presented a material issue of fact regarding
the existence of a disability. Id. In other words, Judges Kennedy and Guy found that Gilday's
impairment in its aided state may still substantially limit a major life activity. Id.
163. See id. (showing contrasting opinions among judges). The majority opinion of the
court remanded the claim for further consideration. Id. All three judges concurred that, with
or without consideration of mitigating measures, Gilday had presented a material issue of fact
regarding the substantially limiting nature of his impairment. Id. Judge Moore wrote the
opinion for the court on this issue. Id. at 766. Judge Kennedy, however, wrote the opinion for
the court on the issue of mitigating measures, finding that courts should consider mitigating
measures when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment. Id.
164. Id. at 766-68.
165. Id. at 767.
166. See id. at 766-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1994)) (discussing ADA's defini-
tion of disability).
167. See id. at 767 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)) (discussing assistance of
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Judge Kennedy recognized that the ADA's legislative history appears to
support the EEOC's position."' However, she noted that when the actual text
of the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to look to the legislative history
for clarification. 72 According to Judge Kennedy, the statutory language on
this issue was clear: an impairment must actually substantially limit a major
life activity in order to rise to the level of a disability.73 Judge Kennedy
concluded, and Judge Guy concurred, that courts should not adhere to the
EEOC interpretive guidelines on the issue of mitigating measures. 74
2. Internal Inconsistencies of the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines
An agency's interpretation of a statute is unreasonable if the interpreta-
tion itself is internally inconsistent or is inconsistent with other agency
positions on that statute.'75 In such situations, courts arejustified in disregard-
ing agency interpretations. 76 Many courts have determined that the EEOC's
position on mitigating measures does not coincide with its interpretation of
other aspects of the ADA including, in particular, what constitutes a substan-
tially limiting impairment.'77 This internal inconsistency has led these courts
to disregard the EEOC interpretive guidelines and to formulate for themselves
the correct method of evaluating claims aided by medication. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Sutton v.
UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 179 addressed this internal tension inthe EEOC interpre-
171. Id.
172. See id. (explaining when courts should use legislative history to interpret statutes)
(citing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 108 (describing when courts should follow
agency's interpretation).
176. See id. (stating that courts do not have to follow unreasonable agency interpretation);
Anthony, supra note 36, at 54-58 (same). If an agency interpretation is internally inconsistent,
the courts can determine that it is an unreasonable interpretation and not worthy of deference.
Id.
177. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
EEOC's position on mitigating measures does not coincide with its position on "substantially
limiting" requirement); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I.
1997) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan. 1996)
(finding EEOC's position on mitigating measures contradicts its own example of individual who
satisfies "regarded as" disabled prong of disability definition), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.
1998).
178. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902 (disregarding EEOC position on mitigating measures);
Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 108 (same); Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881 (same).
179. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
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tive guidelines. 8 ° The claimants in Sutton contested United Air Lines's
(United) decision not to hire them.'81 The parties stipulated that United failed
to hire the claimants because of their uncorrected visual acuity levels.12 In
deciding whether to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, the court
directly addressed the issue of mitigating measures.'
The Sutton court concluded that it should evaluate vision impairments
and other correctable impairments in light of the assistive devices that the
180. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 901-02 (10th Cir. 1997) (deciding
that individuals who suffer from vision impairment that is correctable with lenses are not
disabled for purposes of ADA because, with lenses, they are not substantially limited in major
life activity). In Sutton, two regional commercial airline pilots brought a claim against United
Air Lines (United) for violation of the ADA following United's failure to hire them because
of their uncorrected vision level. Id. at 895. According to United's policy, a pilot must have
uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better in each eye. Id. The plaintiffs in this action were twin
sisters who both have uncorrected vision of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left
eyes. Id. Both, however, had corrected vision of 20/20. Id. The plaintiffs argued that,
according to the EEOC interpretive guidelines, the court should evaluate their vision in its
uncorrected state. Id. With such an evaluation, the court would most likely have found that
their vision impairment substantially limited the major life activity of seeing. Id. Thus, they
argued, they had a disability under the ADA and were entitled to the ADA's protection. Id. The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument and in turn disregarded the EEOC interpretive
guidelines on the matter. Id. at 901. The court found that it should not adhere to the portion
of the EEOC interpretive guidelines that addresses the issue of mitigating measures in the
"substantially limiting" test because: (1) it is in direct conflict with the ADA and (2) it is
internally inconsistent with other portions of the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. Id. at 902.
The ADA requires that, in order to rise to the level of a disability, an impairment must substan-
tially limit the individual in a major life activity. Id. If a court does not consider mitigating
measures in the assessment of the impairment, it cannot truly evaluate the actual impact of the
disability. Id. According to the court, Congress did not intend this type of assessment. Iad
Additionally, the court pointed out that the EEOC itself mentions within another section of its
own interpretive guidelines that the impact of an impairment is not contingent on the name of
the diagnosis but rather on the actual effect that the impairment has on the individual's life. Id.
(quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) 1-2 (1997)). Thus, even within its own guidelines, the
EEOC recognizes that the hypothetical effects of an impairment that may arise without the use
of the mitigating measures are not the effects that the court should analyze for purposes of
determining who has a disability under the ADA. Id. In accordance with this rationale, the
court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the action and found the claimants, whose
corrected vision was 20/20, were not individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Id.
181. Id. at 895.
182. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations of ADA violation). The claimants both
suffered from a visual impairment of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes. Id.
United's policy required pilots to have an uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. Id.
183. See id. at 901 (explaining that its decision on mitigating measures issue will have
determinative effect on case). The court recognized the existing division among courts on this
issue, especially within the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 901 nn.7-8. As a result, it attempted to
evaluate thoroughly the issue and create a precedent for the district courts within the Tenth
Circuit to follow. Id. at 901-03.
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claimant used to alleviate the impairment's effects.' In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court first looked to the EEOC interpretive guidelines."'5 Upon
examination, the court discovered that the guidelines themselves were incon-
sistent on this issue.186 In particular, the court noted that the EEOC's position
on mitigating measures contradicts its position on what constitutes a "substan-
tially limiting" impairment.8 7 In its interpretive guidelines, the EEOC ex-
plained that Congress intended the determinative factor of a substantially
limiting analysis to be the actual effect that an impairment has on an individ-
ual. "'88 The court found that the EEOC specifically stated that the diagnosis
or name of an impairment should not be dispositive on the issue of whether
it substantially limits an individual.'89 The actual effect is most important. 9 '
Additionally, the EEOC advocated a case-by-case analysis to assess the actual
impact of the impairment on the individual.'9 '
The Sutton court noted that the EEOC continued its explanation of the
"substantially limiting" requirement in a contradictory fashion. 92 The EEOC
stated that in the evaluation of an impairment's limiting effect mitigating
measures should not be a consideration. 93 In suggesting this, the court
reasoned, the EEOC recommended that courts evaluate the effects of an
impairment that might occur without medication - in other words, the hypo-
thetical impact of an impairment.'94 This method of evaluation, the Sutton
court reasoned, is totally inconsistent with the EEOC's prior statement that the
actual effect on the individual's life is the determinative factor in assessing
whether or not the impairment is substantially limiting. 9' Because of this
underlying tension within the EEOC guidelines, the Sutton court did not
adhere to the recommendations contained in the guidelines.'96 Instead, the
184. See id. at 902 (deciding to evaluate claimants' visual impairmentin its corrected state).
185. See id. (evaluating EEOC guidelines on mitigating measures).
186. See id. (stating tension in EEOC guidelines undermines the guidelines' credibility).
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
189. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
190. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)).
191. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)) (discussing EEOC's preference for case by
case analysis of ADA claims).
192. Id.
193. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1997)) (discussing EEOC's position on
mitigating measures).
194. See id. (pointing out inevitable result of adherence to EEOC's position: courts will
permit hypothetical limits of impairments to raise impairment to level of disability).
195. Id.
196. Id.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 917 (1998)
Sutton court applied what it considered to be the plain language of the ADA:
an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity. 97 This plain
language, the court concluded, necessarily dictates an evaluation of an
impairment in its medicated state.' 9
The Sutton court, along with several district courts, concluded that the
underlying tension of the EEOC interpretive guidelines made the EEOC's
position an unreasonable construction of the ADA. 99 As a result, these
courts chose not to adhere to the agency's instructions to disregard mitigat-
ing measures in their evaluations.2 0 Instead, these courts concluded from
the plain language of the ADA that courts should incorporate mitigating
measures into the evaluation of an impairment.20'
The courts described in this section have concluded that courts should
incorporate into their impairment analysis mitigating measures which the
claimant uses to alleviate the symptoms of her impairment. 2 According to
these courts, the plain language of the ADA and certain sections of the
EEOC regulations dictate such a decision.20 3 This conclusion has placed
these courts directly at odds with the courts that have chosen to disregard
mitigating measures in impairment evaluations, creating a division among
the circuits and confusion among litigants. Clearly, this issue must be
resolved.
IV A New Approach: A Multi-Factored Guideline to the
Mitigating Measures Analysis
After evaluating the legislative history, the plain language of the ADA,
and the information disseminated by the EEOC, courts are still in disagree-
ment about whether they should disregard mitigating measures when evalu-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (finding internal inconsistencies within EEOC interpretive guidelines); see
also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107-08 (D.R.I. 1997) (same);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880 (D. Kan. 1996) (same), aff'd, 141
F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
200. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts decided EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines were not reasonable construction of ADA and therefore not worthy of court's
deference).
201. See cases cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which courts adhere to EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines).
202. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts disregarded EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
203. See cases cited supra note 151 (listing cases in which courts disregarded EEOC's
position on mitigating measures).
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ating an ADA claim." 4 It is unclear which courts are right: the courts in
which mitigating measures are not a consideration or the courts that find the
use of mitigating measures an integral part of the impairment analysis. An
evaluation of the decisions on either side of the disagreement demonstrates
that neither approach is entirely correct.
One commentator, Professor Catherine J. Lanctot, builds. upon the
notion that neither the EEOC's position on mitigating measures nor the
position ofthe courts in opposition to the EEOC's position is correct.20 5 As
a solution, Lanctot proposes the creation of a "per se disability" list.
2 6
According to Lanctot, certain impairments, such as insulin-dependent
diabetes or the HIV infection, should constitute per se disabilities for pur-
poses of an ADA claim evaluation. 207 The instance of these impairments
alone satisfy independently the threshold question of whether or not an
individual has a disability, regardless of whether the individual uses mitigat-
ing measures. 208 According to Lanctot, an evaluation of these per se disabili-
ties should incorporate the use of mitigating measures for the limited pur-
poses of determining the individual's qualifications for the position in
question, an evaluation that takes place after a determination that the indi-
vidual has a disability.209 It is at that point in the court's analysis, Lanctot
suggests, that an individual should present her use of mitigating measures
to show that, with the assistance of the mitigating measure, she is a qualified
individual with a disability.
210
Although this approach may be helpful in a court's analysis of impair-
ments that are included in a per se disability list, this proposal is too limited
in its scope to be a useful solution to the overall problem of mitigating
measures. Lanctot limits her proposal to the analysis of what she considers
"per se disabilities. 21' She does not address whether courts should consider
204. See supra Part III (discussing confusion among Courts of Appeals as well as district
courts regarding mitigating measures).
205. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 333 (discussing need to recognize certain impairments
as per se disabilities which would eliminate need for courts to analyze these impairments under
"substantially limiting" test).
206. See id. (proposing list of per se disabilities).
207. See id. at 333-36 (stating need to recognize per se disabilities such as diabetes and
HIV infection).
208. See id. (describingproposalfor"persedisability" list). Lanctotsuggeststhatbecause
prejudice against individuals is not fact-specific for certain disabilities, the evaluation of these
same disabilities should not be fact-specific. Id. at 337.
209. Id. at 337.
210. Id.
211. See id. (discussing per se disabilities).
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mitigating measures when.evaluating impairments that do not make her list
of per se disabilities. Furthermore, Lanctot fails to note Congress's and the
EEOC's original hesitation in making a list of automatically included
disabilities.2" 2 Both the EEOC and Congress recognized the importance of
individualized analyses of disabilities.213 Categorization of impairments,
Congress reasoned, precludes courts from performing this desired individual
analysis.2"4 Thus, Lanctot's per se disability list is not likely to be an ap-
proach that Congress would favor. Even if Congress accepted Lanctot's
proposal, her approach is still too limited to solve the general problem when
evaluating any claimant who uses mitigating measures.
A solution to the mitigating measures issue that would be a useful tool
for the courts should do the following: (1) address all situations in which
mitigating measures might play a role; (2) comply with the purpose of Title
I of the ADA; and (3) be easily applied by the courts. An approach to the
mitigating measures issue that satisfies these criteria and that, if used, might
remedy the division in the Courts of Appeals is the following multi-factored
guideline that incorporates a three-part test. The multi-factored guideline
allows courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, if they should include
a particular mitigating measure in the impairment evaluation.215 It works by
directing courts to evaluate each mitigating measure's reliability, effective-
ness, and potential for unreliability and ineffectiveness for the claimant.
212. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997) (explaining that nature of disability necessitates
case by case evaluation). In her evaluation, Lanctot cites to individuals who attempted to have
such a list of specific disabilities incorporated into the ADA. See Lanctot, supra note 7, at 333
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 33).
213. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (stating that "the case by case approach is essential").
214. Id. The Supreme Court also hesitates to recognize "per se" disabilities. In Bragdon
v. Abbott, the Supreme Court evaded the task of determining if HIV is a per se disability.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Rather, the court found that the effects of the
disorder substantially limited the claimant in the major life activity of reproduction. Id. Thus,
the Court avoided the need to determine if HIV, and potentially many other impairments, are
"per se" disabilities.
215. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (outlining factors for courts to consider when deter-
mining if impairment is substantially limiting). The multi-factored guideline is structured after
and can be compared to the three-part analysis the EEOC created for courts to assist them in
deciding whether or not the effects of an impairment are substantially limiting. Id. According
to the EEOC regulations, when evaluating the limiting effects of an impairment the courts
should consider the following three factors: "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment,
(2) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) [t]he permanent or long term
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of, or resulting from, the impairment."
Id. Both this three-part analysis and the proposed multi-factored guideline provide courts a
method of evaluation which permits them to consistently rule on issues that are inherently case
specific.
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Courts should consider each factor equally; no one factor should determine
independently whether a court should consider the mitigating measure in the
impairment evaluation.
This approach is rooted in the basic premise that some, but not all,
mitigating measures should be a part of a court's impairment analysis.2"6 In
general, courts should include mitigating measures that are so infallible and
reliable that, because of them, the underlying impairment essentially never
impacts the claimants. On the other hand, courts should not include in their
impairment evaluations those mitigating measures that are not fully effective
or reliable. These mitigating measures more easily allow for a surfacing of
the symptoms of the underlying impairment. The factors incorporated into
the three-part guideline should ease the courts' analysis of the distinction
between those types of mitigating measures. The factors address the attrib-
utes of the mitigating measure itself as applied to a specific individual's
impairment. In particular, the courts should consider the following factors
when evaluating a mitigating measure: (1) effectiveness of the mitigating
measure; (2) reliability of the mitigating measure; and (3) potential unreli-
ability and ineffectiveness of the mitigating measure. These three factors
should enable the courts to distinguish between mitigating measures that
should be a part of the impairment analysis and those that should not.
A. Effectiveness of the Mitigating Measure
When evaluating the specific treatment used to limit the effects of an
underlying impairment, the court should first look at the effectiveness of the
mitigating measure for the claimant. How effective is this mitigating mea-
sure? Does it alleviate all or most of the individual's symptoms? If the
individual uses a mitigating measure that is not truly effective in alleviating
symptoms, a court should not include it in the impairment evaluation. But
if the mitigating measure alleviates all of the effects of the underlying
impairment, a court should evaluate the impairment in its medicated state.
For example, a court should disregard corrective eye wear when evaluating
an individual's vision impairment if the individual can demonstrate that,
even with the corrective lenses, the individual still suffers from the effects
of the underlying impairment.2"7 Another example is an individual who
216. See id. (stating that courts should disregard all mitigating measures). The multi-
factored approach is not as broad. The multi-factored approach necessarily implies that courts
should disregard only some mitigating measures.
217. See Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (evaluating vision
impairment in its unmedicated state), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 693 (1998); Fallacaro v. Richard-
son, 965 F. Supp. 87,91 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964
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suffers from insulin-dependent diabetes. Although the individual may be
able to regulate blood sugar with the insulin, she may, in certain situations,
still not be able to control the effects of the diabetes." 8 Therefore, for this
individual, the insulin treatment is not totally effective. Courts should not
disqualify such an individual from ADA coverage because of inconsistently
effective insulin treatment. If the treatment is not effective, courts should
evaluate the impairment in its unmedicated state.
B. Reliability of the Mitigating Measure
A second factor to consider is the reliability of the mitigating mea-
sure. What is the likelihood that the mitigating measure will become an
insufficient method of alleviating the claimant's symptoms? Again, con-
sider a claimant with a vision impairment who wears corrective lenses. 9
How frequently has the claimant's impairment been substantially limiting
because, for example, something knocked her glasses off? How likely
is this occurrence? If it is very likely, then it would be unreasonable to
consider the claimant's vision in its corrected state. The mitigating mea-
sure she uses is not reliable enough. In the case of the insulin dependent
diabetic considered above, the reliability of the treatment is closely related
to the effectiveness of such a treatment.22 It is possible that the insulin may
not be effective in certain situations. In that case, the insulin is neither
effective nor reliable and the courts should not evaluate the diabetes in its
medicated state.
F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d
893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that courts should evaluate vision impairments in
corrected state); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080-81 n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997)
(same). In the above cases, the courts would have to determine on a case-by-case basis if the
individual's corrective eye wear should be a part of the impairment evaluation. The multi-
factored guideline would prevent the inconsistency that resulted under the influences of the
EEOC interpretive guidelines.
218. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (evaluating ADA
claim of non-insulin dependent diabetic). The court in Gilday evaluated an insulin dependent
diabetic who claimed that, even with treatment, certain stressful situations caused a fluctuation
in his blood sugar level. Id. at 761. This, he alleged, resulted in the display of the normally
controlled adverse effects of his impairment. Id. Under the multi-factored guideline approach,
the court would evaluate Gilday's impairment in its unmedicated state. The mitigating measure
Gilday used was not effective at all times nor was it a reliable treatment. Id.
219. See supra Part IV.A (applying effectiveness factor to claimant with vision impair-
ment).
220. See supra note 160 (discussing Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir.
1997)).
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C. Potential for Ineffectiveness or Unreliability of the
Mitigating Measure
A final factor that the courts should consider is the potential that the
mitigating measure will become ineffective or unreliable in the future. For
this evaluation, the court must consider the mitigating measure as it has
worked for the general population. Does this mitigating measure tradition-
ally lose its effectiveness or become unreliable after a certain time period?
Do individuals often become immune to its ameliorative effects? This
factor is a synthesis of the first two factors and involves an assessment of
hypothetical factors. Although courts generally do not favor hypothetical
approaches, it is necessary to evaluate fully the characteristics of the mitigat-
ing measure. If a particular mitigating measure has traditionally been
effective in eliminating symptoms of an impairment but for only a limited
time period, courts should not treat it as if it eliminates the underlying
impairment. Similarly, if individuals typically become immune to the
ameliorative effects of the medication, a court should not include the medi-
cation in the impairment evaluation.
This multi-factored guideline can resolve the problem of mitigating
measures that presently divides the circuits. This approach is fair for both
the plaintiff and the employer, is consistent with the provisions of the ADA,
and is easy for courts to apply. The multi-factored guideline demands that
courts, in accordance with the ADA and the EEOC interpretive guidelines,
give individual attention to each claim. This individualized analysis protects
plaintiffs by preventing courts from imposing blanket exclusions to cover-
age. Courts cannot evaluate a claim in its medicated state if it bases its
decision to do so on general information about a mitigating measure and its
effects on particular impairments. Similarly, an employer has a benefit
under the multi-factored guideline that she did not have under the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines: courts will, in some instances, consider mitigating
measures when evaluating an impairment. Finally, this approach is not
difficult for the courts to apply. As case law applying these guidelines
develops, the multi-factored guideline will provide a workable framework
for the courts. As a result, courts will become a more predictable and fair
forum for ADA claimants and employers.
V Conclusion
Eight years after Congress enacted the ADA, courts are still uncertain
as to exactly who this anti-discrimination statute covers. The courts are
clearly fractured on this issue, particularly regarding individuals who allevi-
ate the effects of their impairment with medical devices. For these individu-
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als, the court in which they bring their claim could be the determinative
factor in their claim's success or failure. Because Congress did not intend
this result, the Supreme Court or Congress needs to resolve the persistent
issue of how courts should treat mitigating measures.
The multi-factored guideline to mitigating measures is the best ap-
proach. It allows for an individualized evaluation of the mitigating measures
involved in each plaintiff's claim but within a specific framework. Applica-
tion of this framework will eventually create a standard by which courts,
claimants, and employers can predictably evaluate the results of their claim.
The multi-factored guideline will allow courts to bypass some of the ambig-
uous language of the ADA and provide, as Congress intended, a "clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standard addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.""22
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
